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SMOKERS’ CORNER: THE PROBLEM WITH 'TACTICAL ENTRYISM'

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In February 2025, the National Citizens Party (NCP) was established by the prominent youth leaders of Bangladesh’s so-called ‘Gen-Z Revolution.’ This student-led uprising had terminated Sheikh Hasina’s 15-year authoritarian tenure during the summer of 2024. The primary objective of the party was to transition young leaders into the parliament.

The 2024 uprising comprised a broad coalition of liberals, leftists, Islamists and nationalists. The Bangladesh Jamaat-i-Islami (BJI) emerged as the most organised faction. It had been a primary target of Hasina’s government. The movement against Hasina’s rule was highly iconoclastic, actively attacking symbols associated with the birth of Bangladesh and the role played by Hasina’s father, Sheikh Mujeeb, in this birth. He is someone the BJI detests.

When the young leaders of the 2024 uprising decided to formalise their revolution by establishing a political party, the move was immediately met with internal confusion. The NCP’s ranks comprised a volatile mix of progressives, secularists, conservatives and nationalists. Internal debates were often heated but failed to produce a consolidated consensus. Instead, a flimsy foundational statement was tabled, asserting that the party was neither secular nor Islamist.

This was criticised by political analysts as a product of political ambiguity. This lack of clarity became particularly apparent during the drafting of the party’s primary charter. The leadership struggled to reconcile the aspirations of its secular factions with the increasing influence of its Islamist factions. By refusing to define its stance on the role of religion in the state, the party risked becoming a vessel for any organised group capable of mobilising the street. This led to NCP’s controversial alignment with the BJI for the elections.

From Pakistan in 1977 and Iran in 1979 to Egypt in 2011 and Bangladesh in 2026, when loosely organised reformists align with disciplined Islamist forces, the ‘revolution’ rarely ends as they imagine

This represents a classic phenomenon observed across various developing nations, where small progressive groups frequently align themselves with the more organised right-wing forces. Such progressives often operate under the belief that this partnership will provide a viable route into the corridors of power by leveraging the superior organisational machinery of right-wing parties.

However, the historical precedent for such alliances is almost invariably disastrous. In these arrangements, the smaller progressive elements often find themselves ideologically hollowed out or eventually sidelined by their resource-rich right-wing ‘partners’. The NCP’s attempt to harness the mobilising power of the BJI ultimately compromised the youthful party’s reformist identity and led to significant internal fractures.

In the 1977 general elections in Pakistan, and the subsequent anti-Bhutto protest movement, various small secular and progressive parties joined an alliance that was largely led by the country’s three main Islamist parties. The alliance viewed the Zulfikar Ali Bhutto regime as tyrannical. However, the progressives in the alliance frequently found themselves at a loss for words when their Islamist ‘allies’ began advocating for the replacement of Bhutto’s ‘socialist’ policies with a government based on Shariah law.

When the Bhutto regime was toppled in a reactionary military coup, the progressives and secularists in the alliance found themselves in jails or exile, while the Jamaat-i-Islami, a major partner in the alliance, successfully integrated itself into the first cabinet of the new military regime.

The Iranian Revolution of 1979 provides another prominent example of this precarious dynamic. In the late 1970s, a broad coalition of secular liberals, leftists and student activists collaborated with religious clerics under Ayatollah Khomeini to overthrow the Shah of Iran.

According to the Iranian-American historian Ervand Abrahamian, middle-class progressives operated under the assumption that, as the “intellectual engines of the uprising”, they would inevitably dictate the shape of the post-revolutionary state. However, once the Shah was ousted, the more organised Islamist factions rapidly consolidated authority. This resulted in a systematic and brutal purge of their former secular and leftist partners.

A similar pattern emerged in Egypt following the ousting of Hosni Mubarak in 2011. The sociologist Hazem Kandil wrote that the secular and liberal activists who had led the protests lacked a formal political structure to translate their street presence into institutional power. They entered into a tactical partnership with the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood.

Although the Brotherhood won the ensuing elections, the alliance with the progressive youth disintegrated. The progressives felt that the Brotherhood had ‘hijacked’ the revolution to implement a narrow ideological agenda. This internal collapse eventually created the conditions for a military takeover in 2013.

The NCP could only win seven seats in the recent parliamentary elections in Bangladesh. The elections were swept by the centrist Bangladesh National Party (BNP). Critics within the NCP are of the view that its alliance with an Islamist party alienated a significant number of their supporters, who decided to vote for the BNP, which has been a historical opponent of the Awami League.

Progressives/leftists are often effective at articulating grievances and dominating the media narrative during an uprising. Yet, they frequently lack the social machinery required to sustain political power. They employ ‘tactical entryism’, believing that it is more convenient to enter into a partnership with  larger right-wing parties and use their physical and logistical strength to grab a piece of the power pie and gradually steer the government toward reform.

Such moves frequently fail. Right-wing parties are strictly hierarchical and highly disciplined. This makes it easy for them to later purge their more loosely organised progressive ‘allies’. A recent case of ‘entryism’ is visible in the Tehreek-i-Tahaffuz-i-Aaien-i-Pakistan (TTAP), an opposition alliance headed by the right-wing populist Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI). It contains a mixture of sectarian outfits, secularists, conservatives and a left-wing group.

The left within this alliance has decided not to view PTI as a right-wing party but as a populist vehicle for ‘democracy’ and, of course, its own entry into a future parliament. There may also be an ambition that they might simply step into the vacuum and replace the PTI that is in such spectacular shambles. After all, what better way to lead the masses than by hijacking a shipwreck, no?

One can only admire the intellectual flexibility required for these activists to rationalise positions that contradict their own stated values, most notably PTI’s steadfast refusal to entertain any meaningful action against Islamist militants. It is a masterclass in moral amnesia.

Meanwhile, the alliance’s more seasoned folk, who are ex-devotees of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), are clearly treating this populist vehicle as an elaborate audition. Their goal isn’t so much to save the soul of the nation as it is to bat their eyelashes at the establishment, hoping to be hand-picked for the lead role in the next state-sanctioned ‘king’s party.’

Ultimately, the whole spectacle offers far more fodder for a dark comedy than it does for any genuine ‘struggle for democracy’ and the ‘sanctity of the constitution.’

Published in Dawn, EOS, February 22nd, 2026



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COLUMN: THE GHAZAL: ARROW, HEART, LIVER

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I am sharing an excerpt from my forthcoming memoir: Whirlwind of the Heart:

I grew up with Urdu poetry, learning to recite verses from ghazals as soon as I could talk. Words held only visual meanings for me but that changed as I grew older and began to enter the world of poetry. Now I teach poetry whenever I can gather a group of students to take my class.

I enjoy explaining why ‘longing’ is an emotion filled with ‘rasa’ [relish] that should be experienced… Sanskrit poetics emphasises that the content of poetry is emotion and so does the classical ghazal: why love’s arrow stuck in the heart creates a wound that should not heal, why pain is a cleanser. But love is also the source of creation, the reason for existence. Love is both universal and personal; it transcends time and space; it carves light from darkness.

The heart is also a mirror of the self and, in the ghazal, the analogy of the mirror-heart is carried to great lengths. The heart’s depth cannot be fathomed; but the heart can also grow narrow or constricted. Why and how is the heart perceived as narrow? Perhaps because the pain of love is greater than the space in the heart, and the heart is filled with emotions. In the classical ghazal, another organ –– the liver, or jigar –– is equal to the heart in being a locus of love. The heart and liver are often in sync; they speak to each other and are equally affected by love. The liver, it was believed, produced blood while the heart expended it. But while the liver is perceived as the locus of life, the heart is the locus of Divine Radiance.

Altaf Husain Hali and Shibli Nomani, two important Urdu critics of the early 20th century, were critical of the role of emotions or jazbaat at the core of the ghazal. Under the influence of British colonial literary practice and Protestant values, Hali and Nomani advocated, instead, for the role of ethics as a more important component of poetry.

Another path-breaking early modern critic, Muhammad Hasan Askari, was also critical of the importance given to emotions in Urdu poetry. He emphasised the importance of qalb, the heart-mind, as the core of poetry, and argued that Islah-i-qalb or improvement of the qalb should be the goal of the ghazal. Qalb, the heart-mind, should not be confused with nafs or breath, self, soul, essence.

Askari’s thought merged the ghazal entirely with tasawwuf or mysticism. Earlier, Sufi poets such as Hafez and Rumi had taken the ghazal to profound spiritual heights, demonstrating that ishq-i-majaazi or worldly love could be a template for ishq-i-haqiqi or spiritual love. In the ghazal, love of the earthly kind can be a step or stage toward the opening of the heart to love of God.

Koi mere dil se poochhay tere teer-i-neem-kash ko
Ye khalish kahaan se hoti jo jigar ke paar hota

[Would someone ask my heart about your half-drawn arrow/ Could such gnawing pain be there if it had gone through the liver?]

While the ghazal can glide from majaazi to haqiqi love through poetic devices such as tropes and metaphors, I believe that the ghazal, in both its classical and modern forms, transcends any kind of binding themes. Within the realm of the ghazal, themes can be infinitely refined and polished, subverted and reinvented. Thus, I was shocked to discover that Askari considers this famous verse of Ghalib to be weak because it only addresses the external world of love, ishq-i-majaazi, and not the internal or spiritual realm or ishq-i-haqiqi.

He claims that if the love represented in this ghazal was spiritual or haqiqi, then its khalish [gnawing pain or compulsive thought] would continue to escalate, even if the beloved’s arrow had pierced through the heart to enter the liver. He quotes a verse from Ghalib’s great contemporary, the master poet Zauq, to prove his point.

Khudang-i-yaar mere dil se kis tarha niklay
Keh us ke saath hai ai Zauq meri jaan lagi

[How would the Beloved’s arrow leave my heart?/
O Zauq, my life is attached to it]

Zauq’s verse is undoubtedly effective, almost electrifying. Yet, I find myself arguing with Askari’s assessment. I don’t think Ghalib’s verse is any less accomplished, even if it does not allow a spiritual interpretation. After all, there is so much going on in Ghalib’s couplet. It begins with a piquant dialogue between the poet-speaker and the reader-listener: would someone ask the heart about the anguish or khalish that it is experiencing due to the arrow stuck in the liver?

The Urdu word ‘khalish’ has many meanings, including pain; one of them is curiosity or prying intensity. Ghalib’s verse enacts a playful and subtle slippage between arrow, liver and heart, where the arrow itself speaks through the liver, and addresses its question to the heart.

There is no easy way to translate jigar, a powerful and poetic ghazal trope, into English. ‘Liver’ in English, sounds simply gross. However, within the ghazal’s complex repertoire of the bodily metaphor, dil, the heart — a wayward, passionate, wounded, pain-filled, aching piece of the lover’s anatomy — is closely associated with jigar, the liver, which is constant, staid, filled with life-giving, life-sustaining blood. When the ghazal’s beloved throws her nigaah, her piercing gaze, it falls like an arrow to enter the heart, piercing its way down from the heart to the liver in one stroke, making both parts of the lover’s body consent to her power.

To take pleasure in the world of the ghazal, one must learn to appreciate the role of the liver alongside the heart. But the liver-heart connection also carries other serious physiological resonances. When one’s heart is medicated, one’s liver function is constantly monitored. The liver sympathises with the heart’s struggle, but tries to keep it in check from self-destruction.

The columnist is Professor in the Department of Middle Eastern and South Asian Languages and Cultures at the University of Virginia in the US. X: @FarooqiMehr

Published in Dawn, Books & Authors, February 22nd, 2026



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NON-FICTION: BLAME IT ON BASHIR

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Dianarama: Deception, Entrapment, Cover-Up — The Betrayal of Princess Diana
By Andy Webb
Pegasus Books
ISBN: 979-8897100880
432pp.

Andy Webb is a senior journalist who worked for decades with the BBC and Channel 4. Like others, he was moved by the plight of Diana, the late Princess of Wales, who felt compelled in November 1995 to give a very candid interview about her feelings to Martin Bashir (of the BBC) for Panorama.

Her admission of adultery in that programme, coupled with her statement that Prince Charles (whom she indicated was an adulterer himself) should be passed over as king in favour of Prince William, eventually led to Queen Elizabeth II requesting that Diana and Charles divorce. The interview’s ramifications gained traction because the BBC has long been considered one of the finest reporting and journalistic venues globally. Andy Webb’s Dianarama, however, elucidates that the BBC initially engaged in a massive cover-up of how Martin Bashir utterly unethically manipulated the princess to obtain this famous interview.

Perhaps Webb would not have been able to publish this exposé without the help and support of Diana’s brother, Charles, Earl Spencer. According to Webb, Bashir commissioned Matt Weissler, a graphic designer, to create forged bank statements, implying that Earl Spencer’s head of security, Alan Waller, was receiving payments from the media in order to provide information to them on the Earl’s activities.

When shown these statements, Spencer apparently was taken in, and later introduced Diana to Bashir. Gaining momentum, Bashir displayed ‘financial proof’ to the princess of disloyalty on the part of her private secretary, Patrick Jephson. In a private meeting with Diana and Spencer at Knightsbridge, Bashir claimed that both Jephson and Prince Charles’s private secretary, Richard Aylard, were benefitting financially by leaking royal insider information to the press.

A former journalist’s book on Princess Diana’s infamous 1995 Panorama interview with Martin Bashir expects readers to consider Bashir and the BBC’s top brass as the only villains

Why Charles Spencer and the late princess were so easily fooled is anybody’s guess. Bashir, a second-generation Pakistani immigrant who converted to Christianity in his teens, had risen rapidly through the ranks of the BBC, largely due to his charm and persuasiveness. According to Webb, Bashir then played upon the princess’ internal paranoia by convincing her that her children’s nanny, Alexandra ‘Tiggy’ Legge-Bourke, was in a sexual relationship with the Prince of Wales, who would divorce his wife in order to then legally roll in the hay with the nanny.

However, for a reader to believe that both her and Earl Spencer (scions of one of the richest and most established noble households in Britain, and no strangers to the intricacies of high-level political drama) had gullibly fallen for Bashir’s alleged traps requires a stretch of the imagination to say the least. Diana didn’t hold a single O-Level, but Spencer attended both Eton and Oxford. To quote Uncle Digory from C.S. Lewis’s Narnia Chronicles, ‘Bless me… what do they teach them at these schools?’

Though Webb underscores that a paranoid Diana told her law firm, Mishcon de Reya, that the Palace was planning to exterminate her, it was ridiculous of the law firm to hold back about nipping such thoughts in the bud. On a side note, this might explain why they could only come up with a paltry 17 million GBP divorce settlement for her, chump change for the former Prince of Wales, who pulled tens of millions from the Duchy of Cornwall alone.

I’m not saying that Martin Bashir was a saint. The so-called mock-ups may well have been used illicitly to create the pathway to bagging a phenomenally sensational interview, but Webb also wants us to believe that Bashir acted independently and that higher-ups, such as the BBC’s Director-General John Birt, were unaware of his nefarious actions at the time.

Given that Bashir was going to interview one of the most famous women in the world, it is highly unlikely that his bosses would have been completely clueless about what was happening. Oddly enough, during the immediate aftermath of the interview, Earl Spencer remained taciturn about his involvement in introducing his sister to Bashir. The nobleman only became far more active in trying to take the BBC to task years later, ie when his sister had passed away and could not be actively asked to confirm or deny anything.

Bashir was undeniably a pro. His plan was carried out with extraordinary skill, overcoming, as very few reporters were able to do, first Charles Spencer’s bristling hostility to the media and then penetrating the very inner sanctum, Diana’s sitting room at Kensington Palace. Once there, he was able to conjure just the right words and spill them in such a way that Diana, no fool she, was entranced, then terrified, then done up like a kipper. Those are fearsome skills, as darkly admirable as the paparazzo who can snatch sharp photos single-handed from a racing motorbike or snap the million-dollar picture from a hiding place half a mile away. — Excerpt from the book

Webb notes that Tony Hall (a later director-general of the BBC) conducted a half-hearted inquiry into the matter in 1996 and, even though BBC executive Tim Suter knew Charles Spencer personally and could have contacted the earl about various concerns, he chose not to do so. Webb’s claims that Spencer was somewhat removed from matters in 1996 by having relocated himself and his family to South Africa make for a relatively thin argument, especially since Spencer himself is a journalist and writer and would hardly have been unaware of the shockwaves emanating from the interview on both the public and private scales.

Princess Diana’s BBC interview with Martin Bashir in 1995 | BBC
Princess Diana’s BBC interview with Martin Bashir in 1995 | BBC

What irritates me most about this book is how readily we are expected to label Bashir and the BBC’s top brass as being the only villains in this story. Apparently, Earl Spencer provided Webb with a copy of a disturbing fax sent to him by Bashir during the months leading up to the interview (a document which the author reproduces in the book). But Webb never breathes a word about whether the fax was authentic or not; he simply assumes that it is genuine. Or rather, he wants the reader to assume that that fax was truly sent from Bashir to Spencer.

I am sure that when the Panorama matter was more closely examined in 2020 by Lord Dyson, his shrewd legal mind would not have missed this basic point. I’m not saying that Spencer’s guilt and grief at his sister’s death in a car accident in 1997 were not genuine. But that does not mean that the fax he proffered, underscoring Bashir’s alleged villainy, was.

The book is an engaging read, though parts of it are undoubtedly racist. Noting that Diana trusted Bashir because he had Pakistani roots, like her penultimate major lover Hasnat Khan did, or that she liked dark-skinned men, comes across as silly at best and xenophobic at worst.

Bashir himself was obviously not above playing the victim and stating in writing that his ‘second-generation immigrant’ status had irked upper-class Brits, but this was utterly disingenuous of him since he holds a Master’s degree in theology from King’s College London (hardly a shabby school; its current patron is King Charles III himself). Indeed, during the latter part of his career, Bashir was granted the post of the BBC’s editor of religion. The white-skinned Weissler, however, ended up having to take on menial jobs in order to survive.

Intriguingly enough, Queen Elizabeth II is alluded to only once in the book, although I have absolutely no doubt that she was being briefed about the situation throughout. In a rather foolishly heroic move, Webb used the Freedom of Information Act (which came into force in the UK in 2005) to seek emails related to the Panorama fiasco, but the 3,288 messages were so heavily redacted as to be almost useless.

Using license fees, the BBC eventually paid compensation to individuals such as Alexandra Legge-Bourke (her married name is Pettifer), Patrick Jephson and Matt Weissler, among others. Regardless, the whole affair turned out to be a storm in a teacup, except the teacup was the size of the Grand Canyon. Still, a storm in a teacup.

The reviewer is Associate Professor of Social Sciences and Liberal Arts at the Institute of Business Administration. She has authored two collections of short stories, Timeless College Tales and Perennial College Tales, and a play, The Political Chess King

Published in Dawn, Books & Authors, February 22nd, 2026



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HISTORY: THE FREEDOM FIGHTER WHO BECAME STATELESS

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Maulana Mohammad Ali Jauhar (sitting, centre), Shahpurji Saklatvala (standing, centre) and Dr K.M. Ashraf (standing, second from left) along with others in London in 1930 | ZMO Library & Archives
Maulana Mohammad Ali Jauhar (sitting, centre), Shahpurji Saklatvala (standing, centre) and Dr K.M. Ashraf (standing, second from left) along with others in London in 1930 | ZMO Library & Archives

During the hardening positions in the 1940s of the Indian National Congress (INC) and the Muslim League (ML) on the creation of a new state for the Muslims of India, there were other groups and parties that envisioned different resolutions to the “Muslim Question.”

Among these voices was that of the Communist Party of India (CPI), which was aligned with the INC in the late 1930s, yet slowly diverged from it in the 1940s. A major figure who articulated the CPI’s perspective on Muslim politics was Dr Kunwar Mohammad Ashraf — whose contribution has remained somewhat marginal in the received history of this period.

THE PALS OF MEWAT

Dr Ashraf was of Rajput stock from the Mewat region and hailed from a lower middle-class family that had settled in United Provinces (UP) in the 19th century. The Mewat region extends across Haryana and Rajasthan, where the majority population were Muslims (called Meo) and Chattriya (Rajput). A distinctive feature of the Meo community was that those Hindus who abided by the rules of the pals (the tribal groupings) were incorporated into the group, with loyalty to the pal overshadowing religious belonging.

Studies of the Mewat area from the early 20th century have shown how — in matters of birth, death and marriages — the pals would follow rituals and ceremonies of both religious communities.

Dr Ashraf’s grandfather, originally from Alwar in Rajasthan, had settled in the town of Daryapur near Hathras (Aligarh district) after 1857. The family had followed the tradition of intermarrying with Hindus and keeping Hindu names — Dr Ashraf’s father was born Murlidhar Singh, only changing his name to Murad Ali Khan when he passed the entrance examination for railway service as a guard.

A scholar, a communist and an anti-colonial activist, Dr K.M. Ashraf spent his life arguing that India’s Muslims and Hindus shared a future — and paid for it with exile, imprisonment and marginalisation from history

Dr Ashraf was born in 1903 in Daryapur, where he spent his early childhood before moving to Moradabad for schooling. At school, he was influenced by teachers who inculcated the spirit of anti-colonialism in their pupils. In due time, Dr Ashraf joined political activist Ubaidullah Sindhi’s group, Hazb Allah, and took an oath to fight the colonisers.

In 1918, Dr Ashraf passed his intermediate exams from MAO College in Aligarh and re-entered for his BA degree in 1920. These were the days of the Khilafat Movement, led by Maulana Mohammad Ali Jauhar, which was joined by Mohandas Gandhi, with his call for boycotting English goods and Satyagraha (non-cooperation) that would lead to Swaraj (independence).

Dr Ashraf joined the non-cooperation movement and, along with his friends, agitated for the MAO College to not take aid from the British sarkar [government]. In retaliation, the college administration expelled the students. This expulsion led to the founding of Jamia Millia Islamia (October 1920) as a nationalist alternative to MAO College, which Dr Ashraf and his friends joined.

However, Gandhi’s withdrawal from Satyagraha due to the Chauri Chaura incident — in which riled demonstrators killed 22 policemen — and the abolishing of the Ottoman caliphate by Turkish revolutionary Mustafa Kamal — both in 1922 — ended the non-cooperation/ Khilafat movement.

This curtailment brought a period of disillusionment for many of the movement’s cadres and Dr Ashraf returned to MAO College in 1923. He completed his BA honours and MA, and topped his class in the LLB course by 1927.

Dr K.M. Ashraf giving a speech for the Indian National Congress in Lahore in 1937 | ZMO Library & Archives
Dr K.M. Ashraf giving a speech for the Indian National Congress in Lahore in 1937 | ZMO Library & Archives

LONDON AND THE MAKING OF A MARXIST

During the college’s jubilee celebrations in 1927, Dr Ashraf was introduced to one of the guests, the Maharaja Jain Singh of Alwar state. In his address as vice president of the student union, he reminded everyone of Aligarh’s secular tradition and spoke of his own ancestral ties to Alwar.

The impressed Maharaja arranged a scholarship for his studies; Dr Ashraf joined Lincoln’s Inn for his Bar-at-Law and enrolled as a PhD candidate in mediaeval history at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London, UK.

During this first trip to Britain, Dr Ashraf lived with Maulana Mohammad Ali, also supported by the Maharaja for medical treatment in the UK. Through the Maulana, he was introduced to Shahpurji Saklatvala (1874-1936), the Communist Party of Great Britain’s (CPGB) member elected to the British parliament.

In 1928, the Maharaja of Alwar invited Dr Ashraf and Maulana Mohammad Ali back to Alwar for his jubilee celebrations. Dr Ashraf was made in-charge of the preparations and oversaw the entire event. After the celebrations, Dr Ashraf was offered the position of personal adviser to the Maharaja, but declined — having witnessed firsthand the wealth, wastage and oppression of a major princely state. In 1929, Dr Ashraf received a scholarship from a foundation in Hyderabad and, with some support from his father, he returned to the UK to complete his PhD.

This time he had a more economically difficult life but he was connected to a range of young radicals studying in Britain, who were also his friends and comrades. They included Dr Z.A. Ahmad, Shaukat Omar, Sajjad Zaheer, Mahmuduzzafar, Hajra Begum (the only female in the group) and Imtiaz Ali Khan. Under Shahpurji Saklatwala’s initial guidance, this group started to work closely with CPGB in organising Indian students on nationalist grounds.

While involved in these activities, Dr Ashraf defended his PhD thesis (University of London) in the early 1930s. The thesis, Life and Conditions of the People of Hindostan (1200-1550 CE), was a pioneering work of social history regarding the Sultanate and early Mughal period in India.

Dr K.M. Ashraf  | ZMO Library & Archives
Dr K.M. Ashraf | ZMO Library & Archives

THE MUSLIM QUESTION AND THE COMMUNIST ANSWER

Due to his affiliation with CPGP, Dr Ashraf returned as a committed Marxist to India in 1932-33 and soon joined the CPI under the leadership of P.C. Joshi. In 1935, he joined Aligarh University as a history lecturer.

From the mid-1930s, the CPI had aligned itself with some progressive section within Congress — figures like Jawaharlal Nehru, Subhas Chandra Bose and Jayprakash Narayan — who were trying to lead Congress in a potentially revolutionary direction. Therefore, when Jawaharlal Nehru was elected president of the All-India Congress Committee (AICC) in 1936, Dr Ashraf accepted a position at Nehru’s office in Allahabad, becoming secretary of the political bureau and also responsible for the Muslim Contact Cell of the INC.

In his writings, Dr Ashraf argued that the ML could exploit the resentment among Muslim masses stemming from the halted non-cooperation movement of 1922, compounded by the Nehru Report’s (1927) rejection of separate Muslim electorates and rising communal tensions. Yet he emphasised that his invitation was for Muslims to join the progressive groups within Congress. As a communist, he maintained that politics was organised essentially around class interests, which drove the exploitation of the poor and the marginalised.

In a 1938 letter to a friend, Dr Ashraf forcefully defended his work for INC, despite understanding the major reservations that a large portion of the Muslim population held against Congress politics.

In a nuanced position on Muslim politics, he suggested that his friend need not join INC and continue to work with the ML (despite Dr Ashraf’s reservations), provided he could steer the League toward holding democratic elections within the primary bodies of the party, increase its membership and organise it at the local level. For Dr Ashraf, this would lead to the Muslim community to stand up against British imperialism and not be subordinate to its dictates.

The Congress ministries resigned in October-November of 1939, as they opposed the British government’s action of declaring India as a party in the Second World War without consulting the Indian elected representatives.

The start of the War tested the alliance between the Congress and the CPI. Both parties initially labelled the war as anti-imperialist, yet the CPI went further, calling for a national revolution and mass insurrection to achieve independence. By 1941, this somewhat radical line led to the British detaining scores of CPI members, including Dr Ashraf, in the notorious Deoli Concentration Camp.

By early to mid-1940s, the CPI had also started to rethink the issue of Muslim separatism (exemplified by the 1940 Lahore Resolution), being put forward by the newly invigorated ML. In response to this shift in Muslim politics, Dr Ashraf (representing CPI) had started to hint at the nationalities question and the idea of self-determination, which would be developed later as a major policy agenda by the CPI.

According to the CPI, the linguistic and religious diversity of India had brought forward two major issues in Indian politics: the Hindu-Muslim divide and the linguistic-states problem. Was India one nation or were Hindu and Muslims separate nations and, similarly, did Bengalis or Tamils deserve different or autonomous states?

CPI’s more overt support of the ‘Muslim Question’ followed its policy of openly opposing Congress’ Quit India Movement. Although all communist members of the All-India Congress Committee (AICC) at the Bombay session in August of 1942 voted against the resolution, it was passed by an overwhelming majority.

The CPI vote was reflective of how, by 1942, the party had reversed its earlier line, moving from calling the War an ‘Imperialist War’ to a ‘People’s War.’ It now linked itself to the international drive against Germany’s fascist regime. This led to the unbanning of the party and the release of the leaders. Dr Ashraf was also released in 1943, though his health had suffered due to prison hardships and a prolonged hunger strike.

After their leadership’s release, the CPI condemned the British imprisonment of nationalist leaders while simultaneously urging Congress to collaborate with the ML and accept it as the representative voice of India’s Muslims.

In September of 1942, the CPI, echoing Dr Ashraf’s earlier formulation on self-determination, presented a resolution that sought to take the question of India not as a cultural whole, but as constituting various cultures, language groups and national sentiments. In this larger context, for the CPI, the slogan for Pakistan was understood as a call for self-determination and democracy for all nationalities.

Clearly, the right of self-determination came with the right of sovereignty, equality and the right to secession. Following this argument, the CPI’s manifesto for the 1945-1946 elections demanded immediate independence and transfer of power not only to two governments (India and Pakistan), but to 17 interim ‘sovereign’ national assemblies.

However, by late 1946, the CPI had started to change its position on the partition of British India. The party was critical of both the Congress and the ML for accepting the Partition plan. Eventually, although the CPI finally accepted the creation of Pakistan by arguing for the division of the party itself (in 1948), a deep suspicion of ML politics and the agony over British India’s division was the overwhelming sentiment that was shared by most party workers.

Dr K.M. Ashraf (in glasses) with Jawaharlal Nehru (second from right) and Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (first from right) | Social Media
Dr K.M. Ashraf (in glasses) with Jawaharlal Nehru (second from right) and Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (first from right) | Social Media

STATELESS

The violence during the partition of British India did not spare the Mewat area. The harmony and coexistence that was the hallmark of the Meo palbandi system was breached during the months of August and September of 1947, when unexpected communal riots broke out. Within this atmosphere, rumours circulated that Dr Ashraf was mobilising a large group of Meos to create a “mini-Pakistan” in the Mewat area.

Based on the policy of self-determination related to linguistic and ethnic identities, Dr Ashraf and Syed Mutalabi (an activist and friend) in 1942 had put forward the idea of a province that included Mewat and adjoining areas (not dissimilar to the creation of new provinces in post-independence India). Closer to independence, this idea included the abolition of princely states (especially of Alwar and Bharatpur).

The Maharajas of these two states and their right-wing allies used the idea of the “Pal Province” to instigate communal riots and broke the Hindu-Muslim unity that had been guaranteed through ages by the palbandi process; a community of historically mixed religious heritage was being forced to leave. In return, Dr Ashraf was accused by the police of instigating communal violence and a case was made to arrest Syed Mutalabi and him. It was decided that both travel to Pakistan for some time.

As Dr Ashraf travelled to Pakistan, his name was sent to the Pakistan intelligence services as someone wanted as a member of the CPI, along with the additional charge of spreading communal violence. Soon after his arrival, he was detained at Karachi Central Jail, even as he battled ill health.

In prison, his health condition further deteriorated. The government of Pakistan only agreed to release Dr Ashraf on the condition that he leave the country. At this juncture, the government of India did not give him permission to return. The only option was that he left for the UK as a British subject.

While in the UK, his health remained unwell, but he put himself through a gruelling routine of research in the British Library on archives related to mediaeval India, his area of expertise. After spending five years in the UK (1949-1954), he returned to India as a British subject, with a six-month visa. On arrival, he requested Maulana Azad, his mentor and friend, to assist him in staying in India. At the expiry of his visa, no action was taken.

Dr Ashraf spent two years in Kashmir working on a state history of the region and was later appointed as visiting professor of mediaeval history at Kirori Mal College at the University of Delhi. In 1960, with his college contract not renewed, he travelled to Humboldt University in East Berlin (GDR) to conduct research and take a position as visiting professor of mediaeval Indian history.

In his later writings, Dr Ashraf reflected on the 1940s and was critical of the division of British India due to the communalist politics propagated by the British. However, he did maintain that, to fight colonial imperialism, CPI’s policy (and his own) of bringing Jinnah and Gandhi together, and to give due respect to ML’s emerging popularity among Muslims, some concessions had to be offered to their demand for a separate region.

Dr Ashraf’s close relatives were practising Hindus, including his paternal aunt, instilling in him a lived sense of coexistence and mutual respect that he carried directly into his politics. His youth and early middle age were dedicated to the struggle for the freedom of his country, and for equal rights and social justice for the masses. He bore all kinds of sufferings, deprivations and imprisonment. However, once colonial rule ended, Dr Ashraf found himself stateless and exiled in London, without income and with very little social support. Yet he persevered and continued to write and teach in Delhi and then in Berlin.

A mesmerising public speaker, a scholar of Arabic, Persian and Urdu, who wrote poetry, short stories and plays, Dr Ashraf passed away due to a heart attack at the age of 59 in East Berlin on June 7, 1962.

He is buried at the Cemetery of the Socialists in Berlin-Friedrichsfelde, where he lies with the likes of Rosa Luxemburg and others who fought for democratic rights, against fascism and for socialism.

The writer wishes to thank Alisher Karabeav (ZMO Library, Berlin), Dr Razak Khan (Freie University, Berlin) and Ananya Iyengar (St Stephens College, Delhi) for their input.

The writer teaches anthropology at the University of Texas, Austin, in the USA. He can be contacted at: asdar@austin.utexas.edu

Published in Dawn, EOS, February 22nd, 2026



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